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985 
NOTES 
Rebuilding Trust? The Sand Creek Massacre and the 
Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship in Flute v. United States 
 
I. Introduction 
“If courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better 
calculated to excite them can scarcely be imagined.”1 At sunrise on 
November 29, 1864, approximately 700 United States troops attacked and 
massacred members of the Arapaho and Cheyenne Tribes camped at Sand 
Creek in the Colorado Territory.
2
 After a congressional investigation, the 
officers responsible resigned their commissions, and “the United States 
entered into the Treaty of Little Arkansas,” which promised to pay 
reparations to the survivors.
3
 But these reparations have never been paid.
4
 
In Flute v. United States, descendants of those massacred at Sand Creek 
brought suit, alleging the United States had acted as trustee of the promised 
funds and was in breach of its trust obligations.
5
 The United States asserted 
sovereign immunity,
6
 the case was dismissed,
7
 and the Supreme Court 
subsequently denied certiorari.
8
  
For reasons discussed below, the purported waiver of sovereign 
immunity identified by the Plaintiffs in Flute was bound to fail. This Note 
proposes an alternative waiver of sovereign immunity, focusing on the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702. Part II outlines the legal 
background of the federal-tribal trust relationship and the sovereign 
immunity doctrine. Part III discusses the factual background of Flute and 
analyzes the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning. Finally, Part IV identifies an 
alternative waiver of sovereign immunity that could have been more 
successful. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 1. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831). 
 2. Flute v. United States, 808 F.3d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
146 (2016). 
 3. Id. at 1237-38. 
 4. Id. at 1238. 
 5. Id. at 1238-39. 
 6. Flute v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1184 (D. Colo. 2014). 
 7. Id. at 1188. 
 8. Flute, 808 F.3d at 1234. 
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II. The Law Before Flute v. United States 
A. The Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship 
The federal-tribal trust relationship has its roots in common law
9
 and was 
first articulated in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.
10
 There, the Supreme Court 
determined that, because of the historical dependency of Indian tribes, 
“[t]heir relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his 
guardian.”11 This status of dependency brings with it both benefits and 
burdens; the trust relationship provides a source of protection for the tribes 
as well as a justification for overbearing and colonialist treatment.
12
 The 
trust duties of the United States are enforceable through litigation,
13
 and 
trust relationship claims were historically governed by general, common 
law fiduciary principles.
14
 For example, in Coast Indian Community v. 
United States, members of a tribal association sued the United States for 
breach of trust after the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) conveyed a right-of-
way across their reservation for an allegedly inadequate price.
15
 The 
plaintiffs were never formally designated as beneficiaries,
16
 and the statute 
authorizing the BIA to convey the land imposed no fiduciary obligation.
17
 
Nevertheless, the court determined that a common-law trust relationship 
existed and that the fiduciary duty had been breached.
18
 
This reliance on common law principles changed with the Mitchell cases 
in 1980, and courts have since focused on obligations imposed by treaty or 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Brett J. Stavin, Comment, Responsible Remedies: Suggestions for Indian Tribes in 
Trust Relationship Cases, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1743, 1744 (2012) (“The trust doctrine originally 
developed through federal common law.”). 
 10. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 6 (1831). 
 11. Id. at 17. The phrase “ward to his guardian” has been used to demonstrate early 
recognition of the federal-tribal trust relationship, but does not demonstrate a literal, legal 
guardian-ward relationship. See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 12. Stavin, supra note 9, at 1743 (citing WALTER R. ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF 
THE CONQUEROR: THE 10 WORST INDIAN LAW CASES EVER DECIDED 189 (2010)). For 
example, in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court held that due to the Indians’ 
“relation of dependency,” Congress had the right to unilaterally “abrogate the provisions of 
an Indian treaty.” 187 U.S. 553, 564, 566 (1903).  
 13. Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 493 (1937). 
 14. Stavin, supra note 9, at 1744. 
 15. Coast Indian Cmty. v. United States, 550 F.2d 639, 641 (Ct. Cl. 1977). 
 16. Id. at 645. 
 17. See 25 U.S.C. § 323 (2012). 
 18. Coast Indian Cmty., 550 F.2d at 653. 
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statute.
19
 In Mitchell I, tribal members sought damages from the United 
States for its alleged mismanagement of tribal timber resources.
20
 The tribe 
argued that the General Allotment Act of 1887 created a trust relationship, 
but the United States moved to dismiss, asserting that it had not waived 
sovereign immunity.
21
 The General Allotment Act allotted tracts of lands to 
individual Indians and provided that “the United States does and will hold 
the land thus allotted, for the period of twenty-five years, in trust for the 
sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such allotment shall have been 
made.”22 The court below determined that the Act imposed a fiduciary duty 
on the United States and constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity for a 
breach of that duty.
23
 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, however, 
concluding that the Act created “only a limited trust relationship” that did 
not impose fiduciary duties on the United States.
24
 The Court held that, 
because the individual allottees occupied the land for personal use and had 
the responsibility of managing the land, the United States had no fiduciary 
obligation.
25
  
Actual control of the land by the tribal member was the essential factor 
in the Court’s decision. The Court looked to the legislative history of the 
Act and concluded that the Act’s purpose was to prevent alienation of tribal 
land and ensure that the allottees remained immune from state taxation.
26
 
Because nothing in the statutory scheme envisioned United States control 
over or management of the land, it created no fiduciary responsibility.
27
 The 
Court noted in closing that “[a]ny right of the respondents to recover money 
damages for Government mismanagement of timber resources must be 
found in some source other than [the General Allotment] Act.”28 
On remand, the tribal members found such a source. In Mitchell II, the 
Court determined that a trust relationship arose from an amalgamation of 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell II); United States v. 
Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (Mitchell I). 
 20. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 537. 
 21. Id. at 537-38. 
 22. Pub. L. No. 49-119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 348). 
 23. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 541. 
 24. Id. at 542. 
 25. Id. at 542-43. 
 26. Id. at 544. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 546. 
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various statutes
29
 and the Indian Tucker Act.
30
 The Court’s analysis focused 
on the “elaborate control” the United States assumed over forests and tribal 
property.
31
 Unlike in Mitchell I, where the General Allotment Act did not 
outline any governmental control over tribal property, in Mitchell II, the 
Department of the Interior exercised daily supervision over the harvesting 
and management of tribal timber.
32
 Another key element in finding a 
fiduciary relationship was language in a timber statute, which provided that 
timber sales must be based on the “needs and best interests of the Indian 
owner.”33 Notably, the Court found that this fiduciary relationship existed 
despite the statutes’ lack of express trust language:  
[W]here the Federal Government takes on or has control or 
supervision over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary 
relationship normally exists with respect to such monies or 
properties (unless Congress has provided otherwise) even though 
nothing is said expressly in the authorizing or underlying statute 
(or other fundamental document) about a trust fund, or a trust or 
fiduciary connection.
34
 
Trust relationship cases applying the Mitchell analysis look to a relevant 
statute or treaty and determine the amount of governmental control it 
authorizes and envisions. For example, in United States v. Navajo Nation, 
the Court examined the Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA) and found that 
it created no fiduciary obligation.
35
 The IMLA grants the Secretary of the 
Interior authority to approve mining leases between tribes and private 
entities on unallotted reservation land.
36
 Navajo Nation involved the 
renegotiation of one of these leases between the Navajo and Peabody Coal 
Company.
37
 The tribe had been receiving approximately 2% of gross 
proceeds from the lease—substantially less than the 12.5% statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 29. These included timber management statutes (25 U.S.C. §§ 406, 407, 466), statutes 
governing road building and rights of way (25 U.S.C §§ 318, 323-325), and statutes 
governing Indian funds and government fees (25 U.S.C §§ 162a, 413). 
 30. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 211-12 (1983) (citing Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 
1505). 
 31. Id. at 225. 
 32. Id. at 222. 
 33. Id. at 224. 
 34. Id. at 225 (quoting Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 987 (Ct. 
Cl. 1980)).  
 35. 537 U.S. 488, 493 (2003). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 495. 
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minimum required for similar leases on federal land—and the BIA issued 
an opinion letter stating that the rate should be raised to 20%.
38
 Peabody 
then filed an administrative appeal; while the appeal was pending, Peabody 
representatives met privately with Interior Secretary Don Hodel.
39
 No tribal 
representatives attended or were aware of this meeting.
40
 Predictably, 
Secretary Hodel then drafted a memo stating that a decision on the appeal 
was not imminent and that the parties should return to the bargaining 
table.
41
 The Navajo ultimately settled on a 12.5% rate that Secretary Hodel 
subsequently approved.
42
 
The Court rejected the Navajo’s claim that the IMLA created a trust 
relationship.
43
 It reached this conclusion by comparing the IMLA to the 
statutory scheme in Mitchell I and contrasting it with the statutory scheme 
in Mitchell II.
44
 Unlike in Mitchell II, where the United States assumed 
elaborate control over tribal property for the benefit of the tribe, in Navajo 
Nation, the Secretary of the Interior had no managerial role and was not 
“expressly invested with responsibility” to ensure that the needs and 
interests of the tribe were met.
45
 The Court placed no weight on the 
Secretary’s “ex parte communications from Peabody” and instead looked 
only to the relevant statute.
46
 
Mitchell I, Mitchell II, and the line of cases that follow
47
 leave tribes with 
a specific path to demonstrate a trust relationship: the tribe must identify a 
source of substantive law, such as a statute or treaty, which imposes a clear 
fiduciary obligation on the United States. This obligation does not require 
express trust language in the treaty or statute; instead, it requires that the 
government assume control over tribal property for tribal benefit. 
B. United States’ Sovereign Immunity and 5 U.S.C. § 702 
As a fundamental principle of sovereign immunity, the United States, as 
a sovereign, is immune from suit unless it consents to being sued.
48
 This 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. at 496. 
 39. Id. at 497. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 497-98. 
 42. Id. at 498. 
 43. Id. at 506. 
 44. Id. at 507-08. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 510. 
 47. See, e.g., United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003). 
 48. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). 
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immunity also extends to injunctive relief.
49
 Courts will not infer a waiver 
of sovereign immunity, but instead require an unequivocal expression.
50
 
One such waiver of sovereign immunity is found in the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, which provides in pertinent part: 
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or 
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review 
thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief 
other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or 
an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official 
capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed 
nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the 
United States . . . .
51
 
Section 702 is an express waiver of United States’ sovereign immunity 
when an individual has suffered a legal wrong because of a federal agency’s 
action, though the waiver is limited to suits in which the plaintiff seeks 
relief other than monetary damages. Prior to its 1976 amendment, § 702 
provided, “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or 
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a 
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”52 The amendment 
sought to “broaden the avenues of judicial review” and, when applicable, 
expressly eliminate sovereign immunity as a defense.
53
 
The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision liberally and allowed 
suit against the United States even when the relief sought has “monetary 
aspects.”54 In Bowen v. Massachusetts, the Court determined that § 702 
conferred federal jurisdiction over Massachusetts’s claim that the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) improperly refused to reimburse the 
state for Medicaid expenditures.
55
 Massachusetts sought injunctive relief 
after HHS refused to reimburse over $6 million that the state had spent on 
care facilities for the mentally ill.
56
 Although a successful outcome for the 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 182 (1956). 
 50. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969). 
 51. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
 52. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 891-92 (1988) (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-996, 
at 19-20 (1976)). 
 53. Id.  
 54. See id. at 893. 
 55. Id. at 882-83. 
 56. Id. at 887-88. 
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state would have resulted in a monetary payment, the Court concluded that 
it was not an action for monetary damages.
57
 Monetary damages provide an 
individual with compensation for an injury, while “the recovery of specific 
property or monies” is an action for equitable relief.58 Accordingly, § 702 
applied and the suit could proceed.
59
 
Because an assertion of sovereign immunity is likely to appear at the 
motion to dismiss stage in suits against the federal government,
60
 every 
tribe in a breach of trust or breach of treaty action must be prepared with a 
relevant waiver of sovereign immunity.  
III. Flute v. United States 
A. Factual History 
The 1861 Treaty of Fort Wise ceded a tract of land on the Arkansas 
River to the Arapaho and Cheyenne Tribes.
61
 Later, in 1864, Colorado 
Territorial Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs John Evans told 
the tribes that they should relocate to Fort Lyon in the Colorado Territory.
62
 
At his behest, the tribes did so, and set up their camp at the nearby Sand 
Creek, where they flew an American flag with a white flag of truce beneath 
it.
63
 Nonetheless, John Chivington, a colonel in the United States Army, 
conspired with Evans to order an unprovoked attack on the peaceful 
camp.
64
 The details of the attack are appalling. Before the first shots were 
fired, Lieutenant Luther Wilson took companies of the Colorado First and 
Third Cavalries to disperse a nearby herd of horses in order to prevent 
escape.
65
 The ensuing slaughter lasted from sunrise until three in the 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 893. 
 58. Id. (quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688 
(1949)). 
 59. Id. at 912. 
 60. Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity 
and Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 602 (2003) 
(“‘[S]overeign immunity’ . . . underlies and permeates the question of federal governmental 
liability in court. For any suit against the United States or its agencies to survive a motion to 
dismiss, a claimant must find a specific statute that waives the sovereign immunity of the 
government . . . .”). 
 61. Treaty Between the Arapaho and Cheyenne Indians of the Upper Arkansas River, 
arts. 1, 4, Feb. 18, 1861, 12 Stat. 1163. 
 62. Flute, 67 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1180-81 (D. Colo. 2014). 
 63. Id. at 1181. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 9, Flute, 808 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-
1405), 2014 WL 7212984, at *9. 
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afternoon.
66
 Although the exact number of dead remains unknown, 
eyewitnesses reported that a majority of the victims were women and 
children.
67
 
In the aftermath of the massacre, Colonel Chivington resigned his 
commission and the United States House of Representatives ordered a 
committee to investigate the incident.
68
 The committee’s report ultimately 
led to the Treaty of Little Arkansas,
69
 signed in 1865, which provides: 
The United States being desirous to express its condemnation of, 
and, as far as may be, repudiate the gross and wanton out-rages 
perpetrated against certain bands of Cheyenne and Arapahoe 
Indians . . . will grant three hundred and twenty acres of land by 
patent to each of the following-named chiefs of said bands . . . 
and will in like manner grant to each other person of said bands 
made a widow, or who lost a parent upon that occasion, one 
hundred and sixty acres of land, the names of such persons to be 
ascertained under the direction of the Secretary of the 
Interior . . . . The United States will also pay in United States 
securities, animals, goods, provisions, or such other useful 
articles as may, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior, 
be deemed best adapted to the respective wants and conditions of 
the persons named in the schedule hereto annexed . . . .
70
 
The following year, Congress appropriated money to fund these promises. 
The 1866 Indian Appropriations Act provides: 
For reimbursing members of the bands of Arapaho and 
Cheyenne Indians who suffered at Sand Creek, November 
twenty-ninth, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, to be paid in 
United States securities, animals, goods, provisions, or such 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Flute, 67 F. Supp. 3d. at 1181. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.  
 69. On October 28, 1867, the tribes and the United States entered into the Treaty of 
Medicine Lodge Creek, which “purported to establish a new reparations scheme.” Flute, 808 
F.3d at 1238 n.3. The Plaintiffs argued that the Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek was never 
concluded, and that the Treaty of Little Arkansas controlled the case. Id. The court did not 
necessarily accept the Plaintiffs’ assertion, but determined that the validity of the Treaty of 
Medicine Lodge Creek did not affect its analysis. Id. Consequently, it focused on the Treaty 
of Little Arkansas. Id. 
 70. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Cheyenne and Arapahoe 
Tribes of Indians, art. 6, Oct. 14, 1865, 14 Stat. 703 [hereinafter 1865 Treaty with the 
Cheyenne and Arapaho]. 
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other useful articles as the Secretary of the Interior may direct, as 
per sixth article treaty of October fourteenth, eighteen hundred 
and sixty-five, thirty-nine thousand and fifty dollars.
71
 
Instead of distributing the funds to the specific individuals named in the 
treaty, however, the Department of the Interior (DOI) distributed some of 
the money directly to the tribes and returned the rest as “surplus.”72 The 
DOI has never attempted to identify the individuals owed reparations. 
Further, it has never completed an accounting of the reparations distributed, 
withheld, and still owed.
73
 
B. Procedural History 
Plaintiffs, citizens of Oklahoma and members of federally recognized 
tribes, filed a class action in federal court on behalf of themselves and other 
descendants of the Sand Creek Massacre.
74
 They named the BIA,
75
 the 
Department of the Interior, and the United States as defendants.
76
 The 
Plaintiffs alleged that the United States served as trustee of the funds 
promised in the Treaty of Little Arkansas and appropriated in the 1866 
Indian Appropriations Act.
77
 They further alleged that the United States 
breached its trust obligations by failing to provide an accounting.
78
 The 
Plaintiffs “expressly disavowed any claim for damages”79 and instead 
sought an accounting of the reparation payments and an award of funds still 
owed.
80
 At the district court, the Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
81
 The district court 
concluded that the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity and 
thus granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction.
82
 
                                                                                                                 
 71. 1866 Indian Appropriations Act, ch. 266, 14 Stat. 255, 276. 
 72. Flute, 67 F. Supp. at 1182-83. 
 73. Id. at 1183. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Created in 1849, the BIA was initially placed within the Department of the Army 
and later moved to the Department of the Interior, where it oversaw responsibility of Indian 
affairs on behalf of the federal government. Id. at 1180. 
 76. Id. at 1178. 
 77. Flute, 808 F.3d 1234, 1239 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 1242 n.6. 
 80. Flute, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 1180. 
 81. Id. at 1183. 
 82. Id. at 1188. 
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C. Decision 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered two issues. First, whether the 
United States had waived its sovereign immunity.
83
 And second, whether a 
trust relationship existed between the Plaintiffs and the United States.
84
 It 
answered both questions in the negative and affirmed the dismissal.
85
 
The Plaintiffs argued that the United States waived its sovereign 
immunity in a statute appropriating money to the DOI.
86
 Title I of The 
Department of the Interior, Environment, And Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 2010 (“DOI Appropriation Act”) provides:  
[N]otwithstanding any other provision of law, the statute of 
limitations shall not commence to run on any claim, including 
any claim in litigation pending on the date of the enactment of 
this Act, concerning losses to or mismanagement of trust funds, 
until the affected tribe or individual Indian has been furnished 
with an accounting of such funds from which the beneficiary can 
determine whether there has been a loss . . . .
87
 
According to the Plaintiffs, this language both tolled the statute of 
limitations until they received an accounting and waived sovereign 
immunity.
88
 The court disagreed. Because a waiver of sovereign immunity 
must be expressed unequivocally,
89
 and because nothing in the DOI 
Appropriation Act even mentioned sovereign immunity, the court 
concluded that the United States had not consented to be sued.
90
 
In arguing otherwise, the Plaintiffs relied on Shoshone Indian Tribe of 
Wind River Reservation v. United States.
91
 There, Indian tribes filed a 
lawsuit against the United States, alleging that the United States had 
breached its trust obligations by mismanaging the tribes’ sand and gravel 
resources.
92
 The government argued that the claim was barred by the 
applicable six-year statute of limitations,
93
 while the tribes maintained that 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Flute, 808 F.3d at 1240. 
 84. Id. at 1243. 
 85. Id. at 1247. 
 86. Id. at 1240. 
 87. Pub. L. No. 111-88, tit. I, 123 Stat. 2904, 2922 (2009).  
 88. Flute, 808 F.3d at 1240. 
 89. United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992). 
 90. Flute, 808 F.3d at 1240. 
 91. 364 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Shoshone II). 
 92. Id. at 1341. 
 93. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012). 
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the DOI Appropriation Act
94
 tolled it.
95
 The Federal Circuit agreed with the 
tribe, holding that “[b]y the plain language of the [DOI Appropriation] Act, 
Congress has expressly waived its sovereign immunity and deferred the 
accrual of the Tribes' cause of action until an accounting is provided.”96  
In Flute, the Plaintiffs used this language to argue that the DOI 
Appropriation Act waived sovereign immunity for their claim as well.
97
 
Again, the Tenth Circuit disagreed. Although it admitted that the Federal 
Circuit’s language was “imprecise,” the court examined the context of 
Shoshone II to clarify the language’s meaning.98 The claims in Shoshone II 
arose under the Tucker Act
99
 and the Indian Tucker Act,
100
 statutes that 
each contained an express waiver of sovereign immunity.
101
 In Shoshone I, 
the Federal Circuit determined that sovereign immunity had been waived 
under those statutes,
102
 while the issue in Shoshone II was the applicable 
statute of limitations.
103
 The Tenth Circuit concluded that in Flute, unlike in 
the Shoshone litigation, the Plaintiffs could not identify any waiver of 
sovereign immunity other than the DOI Appropriation Act.
104
 Finally, the 
court noted that even if the Plaintiffs correctly interpreted the Federal 
Circuit’s holding, it would still refuse to follow that holding because of the 
long-established rule that waivers of sovereign immunity must be 
unequivocal.
105
 
In their jurisdictional statement, the Plaintiffs in Flute asserted that “[t]he 
District Court's jurisdiction in this case arises from 5 U.S.C. § 702.”106 This 
provision was never cited again, nor did the Plaintiffs explain how it 
conferred jurisdiction. In a footnote, the court concluded that this “passing 
reference” would not be considered because the Plaintiffs had provided no 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Shoshone II involved the 2003 version of the DOI Appropriation Act, while the 
present case involves the 2009 version. The relevant language is the same. 
 95. Shoshone II, 364 F.3d at 1344. 
 96. Id. at 1346. 
 97. Flute, 808 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 98. Id.  
 99. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012) (as amended). 
 100. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2012) (as amended). 
 101. Flute, 808 F.3d at 1241. 
 102. Shoshone Indian Tribe v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 60, 62 (2001) (Shoshone I). 
 103. Flute, 808 F.3d at 1241. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 1242 (citing United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992)). 
 106. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Flute, 808 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-
1405), 2014 WL 7212984, at *1. 
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argument nor reasoned analysis to support their assertion.
107
 The court also 
stated that § 702 does not operate to waive sovereign immunity for any 
claim that accrued before the provision’s effective date of October 21, 
1976.
108
 
The Tenth Circuit based the dismissal on its conclusion that the United 
States had not waived sovereign immunity, but the court also held that even 
if sovereign immunity had been waived, the jurisdictional defect would 
remain because no trust relationship existed between the Plaintiffs and the 
United States.
109
 The DOI Appropriation Act applies only to claims 
“concerning losses to or mismanagement of trust funds.”110 The court 
determined that because the Act requires a trust relationship and no trust 
relationship existed, any purported waiver of sovereign immunity in the Act 
was inapplicable to the Plaintiffs.
111
 
The court’s central conclusion regarding the existence of a trust 
relationship was, “The Government's Assumption of the Fiduciary Duties 
Associated with a Trust Relationship Must Be Established by Express 
Statutory or Regulatory Language,”112 and that the Plaintiffs had failed to 
identify any such language.
113
 According to the Plaintiffs, the Treaty of 
Little Arkansas and the 1866 Appropriations Act established the United 
States’ fiduciary obligations.114 The court rejected this argument, relying in 
part on the fact that “neither the treaty nor the 1866 Appropriations Act 
contain[ed] any express trust language.”115 It reasoned that nothing in either 
source indicated congressional intent to create an ongoing fiduciary 
obligation, but instead the treaty and the Act created the obligation for a 
one-time payment.
116
 After considering the Mitchell cases, it contrasted 
Flute with Mitchell II by finding that neither the treaty nor the Act 
contemplated elaborate governmental control of tribal property.
117
 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Flute, 808 F.3d at 1240 n.4. 
 108. Id. (citing United States v. Murdock Mach. & Eng'g Co., 81 F.3d 922, 929 n.8 (10th 
Cir. 1996)). 
 109. Id. at 1242. 
 110. Pub. L. No. 111-88, tit. I, 123 Stat. 2904, 2922 (2009). 
 111. Flute, 808 F.3d at 1243. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 1245. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 1245-46. 
 116. Id. at 1246. 
 117. Id.  
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Similarly, it found that, unlike Mitchell II, there was no directive for the 
government to manage the property for the best interests of the Indian.
118
 
Judge Phillips concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the United States 
had not waived sovereign immunity, but disagreed with the majority’s 
conclusion that no trust relationship existed.
119
 In his view, the majority 
placed “undue emphasis on the absence of express trust language.”120 He 
analyzed the Mitchell cases as well, concluding that the Supreme Court 
values “function over form.”121 Instead of requiring specific language, he 
argued, the Court looks at the level of comprehensive control and inquires 
whether the government was invested with the responsibility to secure the 
“best interests of the Indian.”122 He determined that the treaty, in directing 
the Secretary of the Interior to pay the tribes in securities and provisions in 
a way best adapted to their condition, invested the government with control 
over tribal property and invested the Secretary with enough discretion that a 
trust relationship existed.
123
 According to Judge Phillips, the United States 
currently holds the Plaintiffs’ money in trust.124 Nevertheless, the dismissal 
was affirmed and on October 3, 2016, the Supreme Court denied a writ of 
certiorari.
125
 
IV. Section 702: An Alternative Waiver of Sovereign Immunity 
The Tenth Circuit correctly rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument that an act 
tolling the statute of limitations also waives sovereign immunity. The well-
established rule that “waivers of the Government’s sovereign immunity, to 
be effective, must be ‘unequivocally expressed’”126 leads to only one 
outcome when the purported waiver of sovereign immunity does not 
actually mention sovereign immunity. Section 702 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, however, does expressly waive sovereign immunity, and 
provides a reasonable pathway for future plaintiffs in similar situations. 
Again, § 702 provides: 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 1247 (Phillips, J., concurring). 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1248 (quoting United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 507-08 (2003)).  
 123. Id. at 1249. 
 124. Id. at 1248 n.2.  
 125. Flute, 808 F.3d at 1234 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 146 (2016). 
 126. United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992) (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of 
Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)). 
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A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or 
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review 
thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief 
other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or 
an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official 
capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed 
nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the 
United States . . . .
127
 
In order for § 702 to be applicable to the Plaintiffs’ claim, it must be 
demonstrated that a trust relationship existed between the Plaintiffs and the 
United States,
128
 that the Plaintiffs suffered a legal wrong or were adversely 
affected by agency action, and that the Plaintiffs sought relief other than 
monetary damages. 
First, contrary to the holding of the Tenth Circuit, a trust relationship 
existed between the Plaintiffs and the United States. The Mitchell cases 
hold that to demonstrate a trust relationship, the tribe must identify a source 
of substantive law that imposes a fiduciary obligation on the government.
129
 
This obligation attaches when the government assumes control of tribal 
property for tribal benefit.
130
 Here, the Treaty of Little Arkansas and the 
1866 Appropriations Act imposed a fiduciary duty on the United States. 
The Secretary of the Interior was given complete control of the $39,050 
appropriated by the Act, and as in Mitchell II, exercised managerial control 
over it. This control was demonstrated when the DOI took possession of the 
funds and distributed them to the wrong people. Unlike in Mitchell I, the 
tribal members had no ability to use the property. Instead, the United States 
had complete control of the tribal property and the Secretary was directed to 
manage it for tribal benefit. A key fact in finding a trust relationship in 
Mitchell II was the statutory directive that sales of timber “be based upon a 
consideration of the needs and best interests of the Indian . . . .”131 Despite 
the Tenth Circuit’s assertion otherwise,132 here also the Secretary was 
                                                                                                                 
 127. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
 128. Flute, 67 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1184 (D. Colo. 2014) (“In order to determine 
whether . . . the APA . . . waives defendants' sovereign immunity, the Court must determine 
whether plaintiffs have identified a source for defendants' alleged trust responsibilities.”). 
 129. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text. 
 131. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 209 (1983) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 406(a)). 
 132. Flute, 808 F.3d 1234, 1246 (10th Cir. 2015) (“And unlike Mitchell II, there is 
nothing in either the treaty or the 1866 Appropriations Act that contemplates the 
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invested with the authority and responsibility to act in the best interest of 
the tribes. The treaty provided: “The United States will also pay in United 
States securities, animals, goods, provisions, or such other useful articles as 
may, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior, be deemed best 
adapted to the respective wants and conditions of the persons 
named . . . .”133  
In addition, the lack of express trust language is not dispositive. Judge 
Phillips correctly noted that the Supreme Court values “function over 
form.”134 In requiring express trust language, the Tenth Circuit applied a 
heightened standard contrary to Supreme Court precedent. The Court’s 
position on this issue seems clear. In Mitchell I, the relevant statute 
provided “that the United States does and will hold the land thus allotted, 
for the period of twenty-five years, in trust,”135 and the Court found that 
there was not a trust relationship.
136
 Conversely in Mitchell II, the Court 
found a trust relationship despite the total absence of any express trust 
language.
137
 
Second, the Plaintiffs suffered a legal wrong because of “agency action.” 
As an initial matter, when judicial review is sought under a general review 
provision of the Administrative Procedure Act rather than a substantive 
statute, the agency action must be final.
138
 “Agency action” is “the whole or 
a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or 
denial thereof, or failure to act.”139 An agency action is “final” if it “mark[s] 
the ‘consummation’ of the agency's decisionmaking process”140 and is “one 
by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal 
                                                                                                                 
government's management of Indian property under an elaborate regulatory scheme which 
directs the government to do so in the best interests of the current and future beneficiaries of 
the proceeds from the resources on that property.”). 
 133. 1865 Treaty with the Cheyenne and Arapaho, supra note 70, at art. 6, 14 Stat. 703 
(emphasis added). 
 134. Flute, 808 F.3d at 1247 (Phillips, J., concurring). 
 135. Pub. L. No. 49-119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 348) (emphasis added). 
 136. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980). 
 137. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983). 
 138. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990). But see Presbyterian 
Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 523-26 (9th Cir. 1989); Reno v. Am.-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 510 n.4 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“This 
waiver of immunity [§ 702] is not restricted by the requirement of final agency action that 
applies to suits under the Administrative Procedure Act.”). 
 139. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 882 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(13)). 
 140. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quoting Chicago S. Airlines, Inc. v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp, 33 U.S. 103, 133 (1948)). 
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consequences will flow.’”141 Here, the Secretary of the Interior’s failure to 
follow the directives of the Treaty of Little Arkansas and the 1866 
Appropriations Act constitutes “final agency action.” The DOI’s failure to 
pay the appropriated funds to the individuals named in the treaty was the 
conclusion of a decision-making process regarding who would receive the 
appropriated funds. This process also determined the rights of the named 
individuals to receive that which they were promised. Moreover, this 
agency action caused the Plaintiffs to suffer a legal wrong. “[A] treaty is in 
its nature a contract between two nations . . . .”142 In failing to abide by the 
terms of the treaty it signed, the United States breached its promise to the 
Tribes. This breach ultimately caused the Plaintiffs’ ancestors to be 
deprived of money that they were legally entitled to. 
Finally, the Plaintiffs sought relief “other than monetary damages.” The 
Plaintiffs sought only an accounting of the reparation payments owed and 
an award of those funds.
143
 They “expressly disavowed any claim for 
damages.”144 An accounting of the reparation payments is certainly not a 
claim for monetary damages, and as Bowen v. Massachusetts
145
 
demonstrates, an award of funds still owed is not a claim for monetary 
damages either. Again, in allowing Massachusetts to bring suit under § 702, 
the Supreme Court held that “the recovery of specific property or monies” 
is not a claim for monetary damages.
146
 Monetary damages provide a victim 
with compensation for an injury; the recovery of specific money is an 
action for equitable relief.
147
 Here, the Plaintiffs were not seeking 
compensation for an injury; instead, they sought to recover a specific 
amount of money already owed. Indeed, that is why an accounting is so 
important: without a proper accounting, the specific amount of money owed 
cannot be determined. 
The Tenth Circuit has already determined that the payment of specific 
money owed to descendants of tribal members is not a claim for monetary 
damages. In Fletcher v. United States, members of the Osage Tribe sued the 
United States, claiming that the United States had failed to pay them certain 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Id. (quoting Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaquet 
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).  
 142. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 391 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 254 (1829)). 
 143. Flute, 67 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1180 (D. Colo. 2014). 
 144. Flute, 808 F.3d 1234, 1242, n.6 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 145. 487 U.S. 879 (1988). 
 146. Id. at 893.  
 147. Id.  
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oil and gas royalties.
148
 The Osage Allotment Act,
149
 passed in 1906, 
provided that each tribal member was to receive an interest in the tribe’s 
mineral estate.
150
 Plaintiffs, descendants of those on the tribal membership 
rolls when the Allotment Act was passed, alleged that the United States 
breached its trust obligations by allowing the alienation of mineral royalties 
to non-members of the tribe.
151
 The United States asserted sovereign 
immunity,
152
 but the court determined that waiver occurred under § 702.
153
 
It analyzed Bowen v. Massachusetts and concluded that an order directing 
the United States to comply with the Allotment Act and pay specific 
royalties was not an action for monetary damages.
154
 
Because the Flute Plaintiffs suffered a legal wrong due to the DOI’s 
actions and because they sought relief other than monetary damages, § 702 
should have provided a waiver of sovereign immunity. The Tenth Circuit 
did not even consider these arguments, and instead stated that § 702 does 
not apply to any claim that accrued before its effective date of October 21, 
1976.
155
 This assertion, however, does not comport with other federal 
circuits that have more thoroughly addressed the issue. 
For example, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly held that § 702 is 
applicable to claims arising prior to 1976. In Hill v. United States, a 
government employee sued the United States, alleging that he had been 
unlawfully denied classification to a higher civil service grade.
156
 The 
employee was terminated in 1969 and the action was commenced in 
1973,
157
 well before the relevant amendment to § 702 in 1976. The court 
discussed Bradley v. Richmond School Board, where the Supreme Court 
held that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its 
decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is a 
                                                                                                                 
 148. 160 F. App’x 792, 796 (10th Cir. 2005). This case returned to the Tenth Circuit in 
2013, where it reversed the district court’s dismissal. Fletcher v. United States, 730 F.3d 
1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 149. Pub. L. No. 59-321, 34 Stat. 539 (1906). 
 150. Fletcher, 160 F. App’x at 793. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 795. 
 153. Id. at 797. 
 154. Id. at 796-97. 
 155. Flute, 808 F.3d 1234, 1239 n.4 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 156. 571 F.2d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 157. Id. at 1102 n.6. 
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statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.”158 Because the 
legislative history was silent regarding the provision’s retroactive effect, 
and because no manifest injustice would result by applying a voluntary 
waiver of sovereign immunity, the Ninth Circuit applied § 702 to a claim 
that arose in 1969.
159
 
The D.C. Circuit has also applied § 702 to claims that accrued prior to 
1976. In Cobell v. Norton, beneficiaries of Individual Indian Money (IIM) 
trust accounts brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior.
160
 They 
alleged a breach of fiduciary obligation and sought a historical accounting 
of the funds held in trust.
161
 The General Allotment Act of 1887
162
 divided 
tribal land into distinct parcels and allotted those parcels to individual tribal 
members.
163
 The United States, as trustee, acquired beneficial title to 
allotted land for a period of twenty-five years, after which fee patent would 
issue to the individual tribal owner.
164
 The Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934
165
 ended the allotment of tribal lands, but the federal government 
retained indefinite control of any parcel that had been allotted but not yet 
fee-patented.
166
 The funds produced from these trust lands created the IIM 
accounts at the center of the case,
167
 and these accounts were severely 
mismanaged from their inception.
168
 The court found that the trusts at issue 
were formed when the United States acquired beneficial title to the allotted 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Id. at 1102 (quoting Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)); 
accord Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 76-77 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 102 
(1974). 
 159. Hill, 571 F.2d at 1102. 
 160. 240 F.3d 1081, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 161. Id. at 1093. 
 162. The Act is often referred to as the “Dawes Act.” Pub. L. No. 49-119, 24 Stat. 338 
(1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 331). 
 163. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1087. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 461). 
 166. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1087. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-AIMD-93-4, FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT: BIA'S MANAGEMENT OF THE INDIAN TRUST FUNDS (1993); U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-AIMD-94-99, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: STATUS OF BIA'S 
EFFORTS TO RECONCILE INDIAN TRUST FUND ACCOUNTS AND IMPLEMENT MANAGEMENT 
IMPROVEMENTS (1994); COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, MISPLACED TRUST: THE BUREAU OF 
INDIAN AFFAIRS' MISMANAGEMENT OF THE INDIAN TRUST FUND, H.R. REP. NO. 102-499, at 2-
3 (1992). 
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land under the General Allotment Act of 1887.
169
 All trustees have a 
fiduciary duty to maintain records and provide an accounting of the trust 
corpus if the beneficiary so requests.
170
 By failing to do so, the United 
States breached its fiduciary duty.
171
 Notably, even though the 
mismanagement of the trust accounts giving rise to the claim occurred well 
before the enactment of § 702,
172
 the court determined that § 702 operated 
to waive sovereign immunity.
173
 The court did not limit the claim to 
mismanagement that had occurred after 1976, but instead ordered an 
accounting of all IIMs created by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.
174
 
The Tenth Circuit itself has arguably already applied § 702 to waive 
sovereign immunity to claims that accrued prior to 1976. In Fletcher v. 
United States, the Osage Allotment Act, enacted in 1906, created the tribal 
mineral interests.
175
 As discussed above, the tribal members alleged the 
United States breached its trust obligations by allowing alienation of these 
mineral interests to non-members of the tribe.
176
 Between 1906, when the 
Act was passed, and 1978, when alienation was proscribed by Congress, 
nearly one-third of the tribe’s oil and gas rights were alienated.177 In 
deciding that § 702 waived sovereign immunity, the court did not address 
retroactivity. Moreover, it neither inquired into the dates of each specific 
alienation nor limited the case only to those that took place after 1976. 
Instead, it allowed all claims, even those based on alienation occurring prior 
to 1976, to proceed. Fletcher, however, is distinguishable from Flute in one 
sense. At oral argument in Fletcher, the plaintiffs’ counsel stated that the 
tribal members did not seek repayment of royalties that had been withheld 
in the past, but only sought royalties accruing from the date that the 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1086 (“The trusts at issue here were created over one hundred 
years ago through an act of Congress, and have been mismanaged nearly as long.”). 
 170. 3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 83 (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (“A trustee has a 
duty to maintain clear, complete, and accurate books and records regarding the trust property 
and the administration of the trust, and, at reasonable intervals on request, to provide 
beneficiaries with reports or accountings.”).  
 171. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1107, 1110. 
 172. Id. at 1086 (“The trusts at issue here were created over one hundred years ago 
through an act of Congress, and have been mismanaged nearly as long.”). 
 173. Id. at 1094. 
 174. Id. at 1110. 
 175. Fletcher v. United States, 160 F. App’x 792, 793 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 176. Id.  
 177. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 6-7, Fletcher, 160 F. App’x at 793 (No. 04-5112), 
2005 WL 3986894. 
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complaint was filed.
178
 Nonetheless, although the remedy in Fletcher 
related to a point in time after the effective date of § 702, at least some of 
the harm giving rise to that remedy occurred prior to the provision’s 
enactment. 
In Flute, a trust relationship existed between the Plaintiffs and the United 
States because the Secretary of the Interior exercised managerial control 
over the funds appropriated by the 1866 Appropriations Act and was 
directed to do so in the best interests of the tribes. The Secretary’s failure to 
do so constituted agency action and caused a legal harm. The Plaintiffs’ 
attempt to receive an accounting of these funds and recover any funds still 
owed is not an action for monetary damages because it is neither 
compensatory nor punitive, but is instead equitable and seeks to recover 
specific money. And, the fact that this claim accrued prior to 1976 is not 
material. Accordingly, § 702 operated to waive the sovereign immunity of 
the United States in this case. 
V. Conclusion  
In its brief, the United States began its statement of the case as follows:  
In all of American history there is no episode more contemptible 
nor more abhorrent than the depredations of the United States 
cavalry on the banks of Sand Creek in Colorado Territory during 
the early morning hours of November 29, 1864. The “Sand 
Creek Massacre” was a tragedy and a disgrace.179 
It then went on to make a number of technical arguments with the ultimate 
goal of avoiding its indisputable moral responsibility to compensate for 
those “depredations.” This is particularly egregious because that the United 
States also signed a document which created an additional legal 
responsibility to provide compensation.  
This Note aimed to outline a reasonable and justified pathway that the 
Plaintiffs in Flute could have followed to get their case to trial. Even if one 
finds that pathway unpersuasive, is there not a marked difference between 
whether the United States can assert sovereign immunity and whether it 
should? As Justice Black noted in his oft-quoted dissent, “Great nations, 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Fletcher, 160 F. App’x at 797. 
 179. Response Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 2, Flute, 808 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 
2015) (No. 14-1405), 2015 WL 1275679.  
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like great men, should keep their word.”180 Bearing in mind how much 
money was spent litigating this very case, and that the United States could 
potentially avoid paying any pre-judgment interest,
181
 it stands to reason 
that the treasury could endure the $39,050 appropriated for the 
reparations.
182
 Consider that Congress has recently awarded $683,600 to the 
Virginia Commission for the Arts to help produce silent adaptations of 
Shakespeare’s plays.183  
The Supreme Court has endorsed the view that 
[T]he doctrine [of sovereign immunity] may be satisfactory to 
technicians but not at all to persons whose main concern is with 
justice . . . . The trouble with the sovereign immunity doctrine is 
that it interferes with consideration of practical matters, and 
transforms everything into a play on words. In our judgment a 
fair consideration of practical matters supports the conclusion 
that the district courts and the regional courts of appeals have 
jurisdiction to review agency action of the kind involved in these 
cases . . . .
184
 
For those whose main concern is with justice, a fair consideration of the 
practical matters in Flute supports the conclusion that because the Plaintiffs 
have been wronged by the United States, they should have the ability to 
seek redress in its courts. 
 
Alexander Sokolosky 
 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
 181. United States v. Pend Oreille Pub. Util. Dist., 28 F.3d 1544, 1553 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that an award of prejudgment interest “rests within the sound discretion of the 
court”) (quoting Home Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Gilliam, 952 F.2d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
 182. 1866 Indian Appropriations Act, ch. 266, 14 Stat. 255, 267. 
 183. JAMES LANKFORD, FEDERAL FUMBLES: 100 WAYS THE GOVERNMENT DROPPED THE 
BALL 10 (2015), https://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Federal_Fumbles_ 2015. 
pdf (questioning whether Polonius was right when he said in Hamlet, “Give every man thy 
ear, but few thy voice”); James Bovard, A Silenced Shakespeare in Washington, WALL ST. J. 
(July 13, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-silenced-shakespeare-in-washington-14368 
25550?alg=y. 
 184. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 912 (1988) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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